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A COMPARISON OF CONVENTIONAL, FINAL-OFFER,
AND "COMBINED" ARBITRATION FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
David L. Dickinson

ABSTRACT

This paper presents results from a controlled laboratory study of bargaining behavior and
dispute rates under three types of arbitration procedures. Two of these-conventional and
final-offer arbitration-are commonly used in practice, while an innovative procedure called
"Combined Arbitration" (Brams and Merrill 1986) is not currently used. Combined Arbitration
combines the rules of the two most commonly used forms of binding arbitration (conventional
and final-offer arbitration) in such a way as to generate convergent final offers in theory.
Controlled laboratory results show, however, that disputes are most likely in Combined
Arbitration and least likely in conventional arbitration. These results challenge the theoretical
predictions of Combined Arbitration as well as the hypothesis that final-offer arbitration would
be more likely to reduce disputes compared to conventional arbitration. The results may be
consistent with the hypothesis that disputants are relatively optimistic about the arbitrator's
notion of a fair settlement. Implications of these findings are also discussed.
JEL codes: J5, C9, C7

Key words: dispute resolution, arbitration, bargaining, experiments

A COMPARISON OF CONVENTIONAL, FINAL-OFFER,
AND "COMBINED" ARBITRATION FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION*
1. Introduction

Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is of immediate interest due to the widespread use
and attraction of ADR, which is used to help resolve disputes in labor/management relations,
commercial and insurance disputes, and domestic disputes, among others. Commonly used ADR
procedures include mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration. Of these, only binding arbitration
guarantees settlement of the dispute since the settlement is determined by the arbitrator in the
event of bargaining impasse. That said, researchers and practitioners have noted that the
effectiveness of an arbitration procedure may lie in its ability to induce negotiated settlements
(see, e.g., Stevens 1966). The identification of the most effective arbitration procedure is then
desirable for two reasons. First, effective procedures imply more negotiated settlements, and
disputants generally prefer to dictate their own settlement. Second, invoking arbitration with
less frequency implies a significant savings in terms of time and money costs.
In this paper I present the results from a controlled laboratory test of disputant behavior
under three different arbitration rules. This lab study generates original data that compares the
two most commonly used forms of arbitration, conventional arbitration (CA) and final-offer
arbitration (FOA), to an innovative procedure called "Combined Arbitration" (CombA). In CA,
the arbitrator is free to impose any settlement on the disputants, whereas the rules of FOA
stipulate that the arbitrator is constrained to choose one of the disputants' final offers. Brams
and Merrill (1986) devise the CombA procedure by combining the rules ofCA and FOA in a
way that generates the theoretical prediction that disputants' final offers converge to agreement. 1
The rules of CombA are simple. If the arbitrator's notion of a fair settlement lies between the

• I am grateful to the Vice-President for Research at Utah State University for funding the experiments for this paper.
The paper has benefitted from conversations with Steven Brams. I also thank lianlin Cheng, Lujun Zhang, and
Pablo F. Rego Barros for valuable computer programming services. I especially thank Stacie Gomm for her efforts
on the computerized bargaining environment. Supawan Supanakom and Bryan Keith also provided valuable
assistance.
I Brams and Merrill also suggest a modified version of CombA that does not yield theoretically convergent fmal
offers, but may involve less uncertainty for the disputants than the standard CombA procedure. I test CombA along
with the modified CombA procedures in Dickinson (2001), and the results suggest that dispute rates are significantly
lower under basic CombA than under modified CombA. For this reason the basic CombA procedure was chosen as
the most effective of the CombA procedures for purposes of the continued investigation.
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disputants final offers, then the rules of FOA are used. Otherwise, the rules of CA are used. If it
can be determined empirically that disputant behavior is in agreement with their theory, then
CombA offers a potential major advantage over commonly used arbitration procedures in that it
is more likely to induce a voluntary settlement by the disputants.
A primary goal of this paper is to report results comparing dispute resolution under the
innovative CombA procedure with commonly used arbitration procedures. A secondary goal is
to provide a controlled comparison of the two commonly used procedures, CA and FOA. This is
necessary because the existing research contains mixed or inconclusive reports on the
effectiveness of CA versus FOA, and this debate is far from resolved. Feuille (1975), for
example, reports results based on field data that support the contention that FOA is invoked less
frequently than CA, whereas Feigenbaum (1975) notes that many forms ofFOA used in practice
are not actually pure FOA mechanisms. 2 Empirical studies based on field data may then be
guilty of comparing apples and oranges by lumping together quite distinct forms of arbitration
under the title of "FOA". More recent research has used lab studies or mock negotiations to
compare the effectiveness of different ADR procedures. Notz and Starke (1978) generally
conclude that there is more concessionary behavior under FOA than under CA, while
Ashenfelter et al. (1992) find higher dispute rates under FOA than CA.
Ashenfelter et al. is the first laboratory study comparing alternative arbitration
procedures-CA and FOA are included in their comparison-that mechanizes the arbitrator

2 He notes that in Eugene, Oregon, the FOA procedures originally allowed each disputant to submit two fmal offers.
The FOA system used in Michigan functioned more like mediation-arbitration by allowing the arbitrator to pick and
choose fmal offers among specific issues.
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decision-making process. Others use a mock negotiations format and typically leave the
arbitrator decision-making process uncontrolled, which confounds the interpretation of the data.
Nevertheless, the dispute rate results from Ashenfelter el al. are open to an alternative
explanation given the way in which information was provided to the subjects about the arbitrator
decision-making process. 4 The end result is that additional data comparing CA and FOA would
also be useful in our collective attempts to determine which set of arbitration incentives
generates the lowest dispute rates.
The testing of promising innovative procedures like CombA seems prudent. In essence,
millions of dollars in dispute are allocated each year through commonly used arbitration
procedures which have been shown to theoretically not induce convergence of the disputants'
bargaining positions. CombA is theoretically shown to induce convergence of final offers, and
therefore eliminate the need to invoke the procedure. Such a result would have large
implications for dispute resolution in practice, and controlled experiments offer a relatively lowcost method of generating initial data on promising new procedures.
2. Motivation

3 Ashenfelter et al also examine a procedure called tri-offer arbitration, in which the arbitrator is constrained to
choose either one of the disputant's fmal offers or the recommendation of a neutral fact-fmder (note that the factfmder is essentially an arbitrator who makes a non-binding recommendation).
4 Specifically, while the Ashenfelter et al (1992) design presents arbitrator information in their CA treatment by
means of a table of 100 draws from the distribution used to simulate the arbitrator's notion of a fair settlement, pairs
of fmal offers are shown along with the resultant arbitrator choice under FOA-this is a different information
provision process from that used in the CA treatment. Subjects may form expectations of arbitrator settlement
distributions differently under the different information provision process of CA and FOA. These different
expectations may then be responsible for the differences in settlement rates, among other things, between CA and
FOA in their study. Indeed, if the information provision under FOA causes subjects to create expectations that the
arbitrator distribution of fair settlements is of lower variance than it is in CA (which is likely given that the most
extreme potential settlement values in FOA are not determined by the arbitrator's notion of a fair settlement but
rather by the disputants' fmal offers), then the disputants' uncertainty about the arbitrator is not controlled for across
treatments. The results of Farber and Katz (1979) are worth noting here. More uncertainty about the arbitrator's
distribution of fair settlement, ceteris paribus, increases the contract zone for mutually beneficial negotiated
settlements. While a positive contract zone does not guarantee a negotiated settlement, it would not be illogical to
conclude that the perceived lesser uncertainty under FOA, which would cause a smaller contract zone between the
disputants, might therefore lead to the higher dispute rate in FOA that Ashenfelter et al (1992) report.
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There is certainly no lack of interest in ADR procedure, arbitration among them. It can
be said, unequivocally, that ADR use is on a dramatic rise in response to a growing discontent
with the costs and delays of traditional litigation. The Justice Department, for example, diverted
1,800 cases in litigation to ADR in 1998, up from just over 500 in 1995 (Dispute Resolution
Times). The CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution reports that 56% of federal judges favor court

ADR use, 97% of corporate executives favor ADR, and thousands of companies and law firms
have signed a policy statement promising to explore or advise clients about ADR
(www.cpradr.org/whyadr.htm). Also, a key component in administering many states' (and
Canada's) automobile lemon laws is the use of arbitration, either through manufacturersponsored programs or state administered lemon law arbitration programs. The use of ADR is
also getting a boost from the growth of Internet sales traffic. Online dispute resolution can be
found at www.SquareTrade.com, www.Cybersettle.com, and www.ClickNSettle.com, to name a
few Web sites.
The attraction of any ADR procedure lies in the belief that it can help resolve disputes
more effectively and efficiently than otherwise would be the case. One should note also that
ADR procedures, such as arbitration, are not just reserved for the settlement of disputes
involving small sums of money. Professional baseball players use salary arbitration to allocate
millions of dollars in dispute, the arbitration of labor contract terms covering large numbers of
workers can also involve millions of dollars, and arbitration was used to recently award "$16
million to the heirs of Abraham Zapruder for the sale to the U.S., government of Zapruder's
historic home movie ... " capturing the assassination of President John F. Kennedy (Dispute
Resolution Times).5 Even the average smaller sums of money handled in online ADR are, on the

5 To note some perhaps more intriguing instances of arbitration, Ashenfelter et al (1992) reports that a type of
arbitration was used to hand the death sentence to Socrates in ancient Athens, and President George Washington's
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aggregate, quite large. The online dispute resolution company Cybersettle.com, for example, is
now used by nearly 500 insurance companies, has 16,000 current users in its system, and is
already responsible for over $37 million worth of settlements. Part of the attraction of ADR is its
promise to not only improve relations, but to also save time and money.
In studying arbitration specifically, researchers have shown an interest in examining the
game theoretic incentives of CA and FDA. The general argument is that CA may tend to "chill"
negotiations as disputants expect an arbitrator to split the difference of their final positions.
Farber's (1981) examination ofCA concludes that what may appear to be splitting the difference
may in fact be disputants strategically bracketing their final offers around the expected arbitrator
award. Nevertheless, the result still implies nonconvergence of final bargaining positions in CA,
and so the potential for different arbitration rules that might induce convergence has always been
attractive. Indeed, some public sector labor disputes were being resolved using forms of FDA
only a few years after Stevens (1966) originally suggested FDA as a new form of arbitration
more likely to induce agreement than CA. The stream of research that followed showed that
FDA did not induce convergence in theory. Farber (1980), Crawford (1979) and Brams and

Merrill (1983) show that Nash equilibrium final offers in FDA will generally not converge to
agreement unless there is complete certainty about the arbitrator's notion of a fair settlement.
Empirical research has also examined outcomes under FDA and CA (Feuille (1975) and
Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984), e.g.). Field research has also provided results that simplify the
effective use of laboratory methods in generating data complementary to the existing field data.
Specifically, empirical studies of arbitrator behavior (see Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984), and
Ashenfelter (1987)) have revealed that acceptable arbitrator behavior contains a random

will calls for the use of arbitration in the event that disputes arise over the interpretation of his will (contained in the
records of Fairfax County, Virginia).
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component that is symmetric around the disputants' estimation of the median value of potential
arbitrator settlements. In other words, as noted in Ashenfelter (1987), arbitrators are statistically
exchangeable in the limit. Such arbitrator exchangeability implies that a three-party bargaining
environment can be simplified by drawing arbitrator decisions, z, from a fixed distributionj(x).
This feature of the arbitration environment is noted and utilized by Ashenfelter et al (1992), and
it is an important distinction between their experiments and those in which arbitrator behavior is
uncontrolled (that is, experiments which involve arbitrator role playing).6 I exploit this feature in
the experimental design used to test these arbitration procedures.
The fact that field data support the use of a fixed distribution of arbitration settlements in
controlled experimental data generation opens a door for more controlled studies of disputant
behavior, holding constant the arbitrator decision-making process. 7 The use of experiments to
generate original data comparing CombA to CA and FOA is necessary for an even more
practical reason. There is, to date, no known use of CombA in practice, and so field data on the
procedure is non-existent. Experiments offer the only way to generate data on CombA, which
can begin to shed some light on how disputants respond to the incentives of CombA. The
limitations on the available field data dictate that experimental methodology be used as a way to
generate initial data. The results of such research on innovative arbitration procedures are useful
in that they lower the risk of potential trial implementation of new arbitration procedures like
CombA. 8

3. Framework

6 Example of such experiments involving role-playing include Neale and Bazerman (1983), Grigsby and Bigoness
(1982), and Notz and Starke (1978)
7 This may be important not just to control the decision-making process of the arbitrator, but also as a way of
avoiding the potential differences in the decision-making of student-arbitrators and actual arbitrator. This difference
is documented in Oswald (1991).
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Consider the framework for bargaining behavior motivated by Farber (1980), which
incorporates the stochastic nature of arbitrator decisions into the dispute resolution process.
Disputants each have a desired level of one quantifiable variable, x. Disputant A desires a low
level ofx such that utility to disputant A is Ua(x)=-x (or some parametric shift of this), while
disputant B desires a high level ofx such that Ub(X)=X. Assuming that disputants cannot
perfectly forecast the arbitrator's notion of a fair settlement for x in any given case, the
disputants' common estimate of the arbitrator's notion of a fair settlement is modeled as a
density functionj{x). As previously noted, arbitrators are statistically exchangeable in the limit,
and so the functionj{x) allows the complete description of arbitrator behavior in theory and the
mechanization of the arbitrator's behavior for the experimental environment.
This framework is potentially limiting given that it views all negotiations as win-loss
bargaining. Current theories of bargaining philosophies note, however, that even if bargaining
contains other components of interest (such as attempts to structure attitudes and/or the potential
for creative solutions that might be classified as win-win bargaining) it is likely the case that a
zero-sum component of the negotiations still exists in more complicate negotiations (see Walton
and McKersie (1965)). This research can then be considered more relevant to understanding
disputant behavior in more traditional win-loss bargaining environments.
In a zero-sum game framework where disputants possess a common estimate ofj{x),
predicted disputant behavior differs across arbitration procedures. In CA, the original arguments
were that arbitrators would merely "split the difference" as they compromised between the
disputants' final bargaining positions. On the other hand, Farber (1981) offers an alternative
explanation that the disputants bracket their final offers around the expected arbitrator award.

8A recent example of the costliness of ad hoc trial and error can be found by examining online dispute resolution.
For example, ClickNSettle.com recently switched their online computerized mediation procedure away from a 3-
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Farber shows that the less weight the arbitrator places on the disputants' final offers, the larger is
the resultant contract zone, assuming disputants are uncertain about the arbitrator's notion of a
fair settlement. This suggests that dispute rates may be biased downward in CA if draws from a
fixed distribution are used to simulate arbitrator behavior. 9 It should be noted, however, that the
exact same process is used across arbitration mechanisms in the design I present, and so
controlled comparisons are still internally valid across arbitration procedures. The implicit
assumption that arbitrators do not weigh the quality of offers is extreme, but it serves to help
maintain control of the simplified bargaining environment.
In final offer arbitration, final offers based on risk neutrality are calculated in Farber
(1980), among others, and it is shown that optimal offers not convergent, but rather separated by
an amount that is increasing in the variance of the arbitrator's settlement distribution.
Specifically, if m is the median value ofj(x), then the final offers are given by

(1)

(1

1J

*
(xa *,Xb)=
m - 2f(m) ,m + 2f(m)

Brams and Merrill (1986) calculate the equilibrium final offers of CombA, and show that final
offers converge to the median value ofj(x) for risk neutral disputants. That is, (Xa*,xb*)=(m,m).
Based on these theoretical predictions, a key hypothesis or this study is that dispute rates will be
lowest in CombA.
The original idea behind the suggestion that FDA would increase voluntary settlements is
that FDA eliminates the "middle" of the arbitrator settlement distribution, thereby increasing
uncertainty relative to CA. It has been noted that FDA also decreases uncertainty by also

round model after only two months of (not very effective) use.
9 Babcock et al (1995) show, however, that a positive contract zone does not guarantee a settlement, or a quick one
when it occurs. Their results do show that larger contract zones are more likely to generate quicker settlements
when the exact size of the contract zone is uncertain. Though the design in the present paper is one of uncertain
contract zones, I do not systematically alter the size of the contract zone for this study.
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eliminating the tails of the distribution (Farber and Bazerman (1989)). Perhaps herein lies the
open debate as to whether or not FOA will produce higher or lower dispute rates than CA.
CombA, however, increases uncertainty both by eliminating the center of the distribution and by
preserving the possibility of extreme outcomes in the tails of the arbitration settlement
distribution. Brams and Merrill note that it is precisely this possibility of a settlement more
extreme than either final offer-along with the elimination of compromise settlements-that
drive the convergence property of CombA. The general intuition of the predicted dispute rates
can be thought of as based on the degree of uncertainty created for the disputants.
4.

Experimental Environment
The experimental environment is motivated by Ashenfelter et al (1992). Subjects are

randomly and anonymously matched with a counterpart for twenty 2-minute rounds, and subjects
bargaining over the value of a variable,

X.1O

Communication is not allowed during the

experiment other than the numeric messages transmitted through the subjects' computer
terminals-the computer application transmits messages over the Internet as a way of
networking the subjects together in the experiment. Disputant A in the experiment is given a
payoff sheet that shows how cash experimental earnings linearly increase as x decreases,
whereas disputant B's payoffs linearly increase in x. Each subject is aware that counterpart
earnings move opposite hislher own earnings, but the subjects are unaware of the level of
counterpart payoffs for different values of x. As is true with the theoretical predictions based on
zero-sum bargaining, subjects are aware that their own gain is their counterpart's loss at the
margin, but payoff levels are private information to simulate the real world asymmetry that exists
in assessing the value that your bargaining counterpart may place on the object of negotiations

JO Pilot experiment detennined that 2-minute rounds were sufficient to allow subjects to negotiate a settlement if
they truly desired to. This detennination was based, in part, on subject comments following the pilot experiments.
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One additional detail of the environment is meant to simulate the real world uncertainty
that often exists in knowing your counterpart's reservation value. Disputant A is instructed to
bargain for x E [200,700], whereas disputant B is instructed to bargain for x E [300,800]. Again,
the theoretical predictions are not altered by this particular detail of the zero-sum game, but this
detail is meant to improve the external validity of the data generated in this environment since
real-world bargainers would likely not have full information on their counterpart's target
bargaining range. Further, the asymmetric bargaining ranges will help avoid rule-of-thumb
outcomes of a simple 50-50 split of the "pie".11 The "pie" over which the disputants bargain in
each round is a $2.00 pie which would be equally split among the disputants at x=500. Each
one-unit change in x increases or decreases disputant payoffs by one-half cent. Subjects are
reminded that their counterpart's bargaining range may not be the same as their own, and payoffs
were not truncated at zero in the event that subjects agreed to values ofx outside of their
bargaining range (e.g., if disputant A agrees to x=800, then disputant A (B) receives $-.50
($2.50) for that round).
Subjects proceed through on-screen instructions that explain in detail all aspects of the
experimental bargaining environment. 12 In this environment, disputants are free to exchange
numeric offers of x any way they desire. There is no stipulation that offers must "improve" upon
previous offers or wait for counteroffers. The standing (most recent) offer of either disputant is
displayed at the top of the offer queue, and either disputant can accept hislher counterpart's

II Ashenfelter et al (1992) similarly expressed this concern over mechanical settlements to "split-the-pie". They
chose to make the arbitrator's mean value of the settlement distribution higher than the midpoint of the disputants'
bargaining range. This feature might make it more difficult for disputants to reach an agreement, and so the present
environment may suffer from the same bias towards disagreement. However, comparisons across procedures are
still valid.
12 Copies of the experimental instructions can be viewed at http ://www .usu .edui~econmhr/instruction s.h tm l.
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standing offer. Sample bargaining screens are displayed in the general instructions to highlight
these important details.
Upon finishing general instructions, the subjects proceed through instructions specific to
the dispute resolution procedure that will be used in the event that no agreement on the value of x
is reached by the end of the bargaining round. Unlike in Ashenfelter et aI, each bargaining pair
completes 5 consecutive rounds of each of 4 dispute resolution procedures-CA, FOA, CombA,
and no arbitration (NA)-to create a within subjects design. Subjects were unaware that 5
rounds of each treatment would be completed. In naturally occurring environments, bargaining
impasse still occurs even in the absence of ADR procedures such as arbitration. Arbitration's
primary disagreement costs are in terms of uncertainty (as noted by Farber and Katz (1979)),
whereas strikes and lockouts, for example, produce more certain monetary costs of disagreement.
For this reason, I include a NA treatment in which disagreement generates a payoff of zero to
both disputants for that round.
In the arbitration treatments, which different pairs complete in randomized order, subjects
are given information about the nature of the arbitrator decision-making process by means of a
table of 100 numbers. The table is generated from the same distribution that describes the
arbitrator's notion of a fair settlement. In all arbitration treatments, this distribution is a normal
distribution with mean=500 and standard deviation=60-this parameterization generates
predicted final offers under FOA ofxa=425, and xb=575, whereas under CombA final offers are
predicted to converge to xa=xb=500. Subjects are informed that these numbers are the last 100
draws from the same distribution that is used in the specific arbitration procedure that will
determine their settlements. In CA, the value drawn from the preferred settlement distribution
would determine the settlement. In FOA, the value drawn is compared to the disputant final

12

offers, and the final offer closest to the arbitrator draw is chosen as the settlement. In CombA,
the instructions are also appropriately altered to describe the use of CA whenever the arbitrator
draw is more extreme than either final offer, and the use of FOA when the arbitrator draw lies
between the two final offers. The instructions describe each arbitration procedure in generic
language, and the experiment and instructions contain only context-neutral (e.g., words like
dispute, arbitration, union, etc. are not used)
A key distinction between this design and the design presented in Ashenfelter et al is that
the way in which information about the arbitrator decision-making process is identical across
treatments. Ashenfelter el al alter the way in which the information is provided to the subjects
across arbitration treatments. While their reasoning is not without merit-their purpose is to
mimic they way in which disputants might gather information about arbitrator decisions from
field data-the result is an uncontrolled variable in the design which might be responsible for
some of the data generation process. The design I present eliminates the potential that subjects
create different expectations of arbitrator behavior across treatments. In my case, it is serves
another very practical purpose. Since no field data exists on CombA, one cannot simulate how
subjects might gather information on arbitrator decisions from field data.
After completion of the instructions, the bargaining rounds commence for each disputant
paIr. After 5 rounds of a particular treatment are completed, a new set of instructions display to
explain the change in the dispute resolution procedure that is used to handle disagreement. Upon
completing all experimental rounds, each subject fills out a brief on-screen demographic survey,
and is then paid hislher earnings privately and in cash.
Experimental data generation is not without its drawbacks. A "no-communication"
experiment may seem quite distant from the spirit of real-world negotiations. However, face-to-
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face communication would imply a loss of control over the environment as outcomes might be
generated, in part, by " ... uncontrolled aspects of social interaction" (see Roth (1995)).
Demographic variables can be used to control for many measurable differences in the bargaining
pairs, but it would be difficult to quantify and control for items such as body language. I do not
claim that such items are not of interest, but the point of this study of to conduct the most
controlled test possible of behavior under the various forms of arbitration. As such, it is better to
remove these items from consideration altogether. 13
The external validity of experimental data is always a concern as well. While real-world
negotiations often have larger stakes, it is ultimately an empirical question whether or not
individuals behavior significantly changes given the stakes of the game. It is true, though, that
the subjects who participated in these experiments are making real economic decisions with real
(salient) cash consequences. Bolton and Katok (1998) highlight the fact that simple lab
negotiations have been shown to capture many important feature of field negotiations, and this at
least implies that we should not disqualify lab-generated data from consideration as valid
scientifically-generated data. Experimental data generation has its costs and its benefits. I
believe that the benefits outweigh the costs in this instance. First, experiments generate data at a
much lower monetary cost than field experiments. Secondly, while experiments simplify the
decision environment, researchers using field data often have to make rather restrictive (implicit)
assumptions in their econometric estimations. Finally, in attempting to gather data on innovative
institutions not used in practice, such as CombA, experiments offer the only viable way to gather
initial evidence on the effectiveness of these innovations.

13 Repeated bargaining with the same individual also means that this is essentially a dynamic experiment created to
test a static theory. It is noteworthy that experimentalists have documented that individuals in experiments often
need several rounds of decision-making in order to learn the environment well enough to give the static theory a
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5.

Results
The results reported are from 48 student bargaining pairs who completed this experiment

during the Spring 2001 semester. Subjects received an average payoffof$18.92 (cr=$3.34) for
participation in the experiment, which lasted about 1 hour and 15 minutes for the average
bargaining pair. Figure 1 shows the average dispute rate results from these experiments. In
Figure 1, data is averaged across all bargaining pairs and separated by dispute resolution
treatment and the within-treatment round (i.e., round 1 in Figure 1 refers to the first round of
bargaining in that particular treatment). Two items are evident from Figure 1. First, disputants
disagree more when arbitration is used than when the disputed "pie" is destroyed in the event of
disagreement. This is consistent with others who have found that arbitration effectively lowers
the overall cost of disagreement, and so disagreement occurs more frequently (Ashenfelter et al.
(1992) and Dickinson (2001 )). We can also see that while the relative effectiveness of each
arbitration procedure is not immediately clear, it appears that disputes are, on average, less
frequent in CA than in CombA or FDA.
Regression-based analysis can help shed additional light on the comparative effectiveness
of the different dispute resolution procedures. The data generated not only allow for analysis of
the determinants the probability of a dispute, but they also allow for analysis of the determinants
of negotiated outcomes. In this analysis, I define a dispute to be an instance in which either the
pie is destroyed or arbitration is invoked. Table 2 contains estimates of the probability of
dispute, Dispute (columns 1 and 2), as well as estimates of the determinants of the time to reach
a negotiated settlement when dispute resolution is not invoked, AgreeTime (columns 3 and 4)
and the determinants of the negotiated level of x, X-Outcome (columns 5 and 6). In each case I

chance (as is done in Ashenfelter et al). Experimental economists often use repetition of the environment to
improve the chances of generating high quality experimental data.
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estimate a basic model of the treatment effects and then a model that includes a series of
variables created describe potentially important characteristics of the bargaining pair. These
variables are described in Table 1 and are meant to capture characteristics of the bargaining pair
that might proxy bargaining and/or dispute experience as well as other potentially important pairspecific characteristics. Each of the estimation equations in Table 2 accounts for interpair
. In
. th e d ata. 14
h eterogenelty
Sample selection is an issue in analyzing the AgreeTime and X-Outcome models since
each model is estimated using data produced only when bargaining pairs negotiate an outcome.
The two step procedure in Heckman (1979) is used to control for sample selection in the models
for columns 3-6, and the coefficients reported are for the direct effects of each regressor on the
dependent variable. 15 The full set of variables from Table 1, along with the treatment variables,
are used in estimating the probits, while the second-stage regressions are estimated using only
treatment effect variables (columns 3 and 5) or treatment effect variables plus a subset of Table 1
variables (columns 4 and 6).16 Interpair heterogeneity in the columns 3-6 models of Table 1 is
accounted for through the random effects component of the first-stage probit estimation.
Starting first with the pro bit equation estimates in columns 1 and 2 we can see that each
arbitration treatment significantly increases the probability of a dispute compared to the no
arbitration treatment. Further, dispute rates are actually highest in CombA, though the
coefficient on CombA is not significantly greater than the coefficient on FOA (p> .25 for the X2 1
(Wald) test statistic on both models in columns 1 and 2). CA increases dispute rates over NA by

14 Specifically, the probit equations in columns 1 and 2 are random effects probit estimators since the value of
interperiod, but within pair, correlation is statistically significant (p=.OO).
15 Complete results on the regressors' total effects, which include direct effects and indirect effects (via the sample
selection term), are available from the author upon request. The key results are largely similar when reporting
results on the total effects of each regressor on the dependent variable.
16 The subset of variables omitted is Jjob, 2,job, Jbusiness, and 2business.
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an amount that is statistically significantly less than the increase in dispute rates under FDA and
under CombA. I7 Consistent with both field and experimental research, dispute rates are higher
with arbitration than without it (Currie and McConnell (1991), Ashenfelter et al. (1992), Bolton
and Katok (1998), Dickinson (2001)). However, the relative effectiveness of the various
arbitration procedures is, if anything, opposite that which we expected ex ante. More will be
said on this in the next section. None of the pair-specific variables analyzed in this sample
significantly affect the probabability of dispute.
Farber and Katz (1979) show that since arbitration affects the disputants' contract zone, it
likely has the undesirable effect of altering negotiated outcomes, not just arbitrated outcomes.
The estimation of the AgreeTime and X-Outcome equations are meant to explore the potential
effects of the arbitration procedures on two key components of a negotiated outcome. The
equations estimated in columns 3 and 4 confirm that each of the arbitration procedures
significantly affects the time to reach a negotiated outcome relative to the NA treatment. The
sample selection term is statistically significant in both the treatment effects and complete
models. The use of arbitration significantly lowers the time to settlement by 18%-32% in the
model of Column 4 for the 2-minute rounds in these experiments. However, each previous
incidence of conflict increases time to settlement by almost 5% (column 4). Additionally, the
coefficient on Round indicates that negotiated settlements occur about 2.8% faster in each round,
which amounts to about a 50% quicker settlement under NA in round twenty versus round one of
the experiment, ceteris paribus. 18 A bargaining pair with at least one female also significantly
increases the time to a negotiated settlement by about 10-11 % per female in the pair. Dickinson

For the CAIFOA comparison, p=.03 (column 1) and p=.10 (column 2) for the X2 J test statistic. For the
CA/CombA comparison, p=.02 (column 1) and p=.05 (column 2) for the X2 J test statistic.
18 Given the experimental environment, the coefficient on the variable Round may be capturing a pure experience or
even a wealth effect.
J7
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(2001) confirms an important effect of the gender composition of the bargaining pair, but his
results show a significant effect only with one female in the bargaining pair (i.e., a mixed gender
bargaining pair). A more careful examination of the gender composition is clearly warranted,
although these results at least indicate that gender is likely an important variable that affects the
dynamics of negotiations even when gender is unknown by the disputants. 19 The gender results
reported may be an indication of inherent differences in bargaining strategies across genders
independent of the potentially important effect of knowing the counterpart's gender.
A bargaining counterpart who regularly attends religious services, though not affecting
the probability of dispute, significantly increases the time to a negotiated settlement. The
variable 1Religious indicates a mixed bargaining pair of one "religious" individual and one nonreligious individual, and so interpretation of this result is somewhat difficult to interpret. Along
with gender, this demographic characteristic merits further study as Dickinson (2001) also find a
significant affect of religious affiliation on bargaining outcomes. Also, when one of the
disputants has been involved in a court case, the time to reach a negotiated settlement
significantly decreases by about 8%. In such cases, the court-experienced disputant may be more
eager to negotiate the settlement quickly given past court experience, or may be able to more
quickly identify the acceptable outcomes given hislher real world dispute experience.
The estimations in columns 5 and 6 indicate that none of the arbitration procedures
significantly affects the negotiated level of the x variable. This is fortunate since a documented
adverse affect on the negotiated level ofx would likely deter the use of the procedure(s) by the
adversely affected disputant. The measure of previous conflict is a significant determinant of the
negotiated level of x. Its magnitude of about +6 indicates that the level of x significantly
increases by 6 units (in NA) with the additional round of disagreement. This may result if

19

This is potentially true at a pure behavioral level since gender is anonymous to subjects in these experiments.
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disputants A, who seek low values of x, are more averse to bargaining impasse on average. Each
instance of impasse might induce disputant A to concede more in negotiations in an effort to
avoid costly impasse. Finally, a pair of female disputants significantly decreases the negotiated x
by almost 30 units. I have yet to come up with a satisfactory explanation for this result. One
should note, however, that the overall second-stage regressions in columns 5 and 6 are
insignificant, and so other omitted factors may be determining the negotiated level of x and, if
correlated with the regressors, biasing the coefficient estimates the demographic variables in
column 6.
In all, the statistical analysis show the following regarding arbitration procedures. The
availability of arbitration increases dispute rates versus bargaining impasse that destroys the pie,
and of the arbitration mechanisms tested, CA produces the lowest dispute rates while CombA
produces the highest dispute rates (though not statistically significantly higher than those in
FaA). Arbitration does appear to affect negotiated outcomes, although its only effect is that it is
found to decrease the time to reach negotiated settlements. None of the procedures tested
significantly affected the negotiated level of x. While the affects of arbitration on negotiated
outcomes do not appear to be adverse, the comparative effectiveness of the various procedures in
lowering dispute rates seems contrary to theoretical predictions and/or the usual arguments about
arbitration and the "chilling" effect. While the initial hypothesis of lowest dispute rates under
CombA is not supported, I offer a simple hypothesis in the next section that may help shed some
light on these results.

6.

Disputant Optimism?
A key assumption in most models of bargaining under arbitration is that the disputants

possess identical expectations about the nature of the arbitrator uncertainty. Others have
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suggested that divergent expectations may be a cause of bargaining disagreement. Farber and
Bazerman (1989) note that divergent prior expectations of the arbitrator's notion of a fair
settlement is a " ... prominent explanation for disagreement in bargaining ... " (p.99). Their
discussion originates with the idea that divergent expectations can shrink the contract zone and
make agreement less likely.2o Interestingly, enough, the authors conclude that divergent
expectations and their hypothesized effect of shrinking the disputants' contract zone cannot by
itself explain field data results on dispute rates under CA and FOA.
Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) also approach the topic of divergent expectations by
exploring how a "self-serving bias" can generate bargaining disagreements. The self-serving
bias results when individuals view as fair that which would benefit themselves more. Neale and
Bazerman (1985) study negotiator "overconfidence" in a role-playing experiment and find the
overconfident negotiator are less concessionary. Farmer et al (2001) find evidence using field
data from Major League Baseball that information asymmetries can lead to optimism that is most
prevalent for inexperienced negotiators. A related concept that I consider is that individuals may
be optimistic in the sense that they inflate the probability that the arbitrator's notion of a fair
settlement is favorable to them. My basic hypothesis is that such "optimism" can, in part,
determine which dispute resolution procedure is most preferred by an individual. If optimism
implies that a disputant expects some arbitration procedures to generate better average payoffs
for him/herself, then the disputant is likely to invoke those procedures more frequently. That is,
for a given set of final offers, optimism can imply higher (subjective) expected payoffs under
certain arbitration rules.

20 Brams and Merrill (1986) actually show that under certain conditions CombA still generates predicted convergent
fmal offers even if disputants possess divergent expectations that are not too divergent. The divergence in
expectations that they consider is different than what I am hypothesizing here.
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First, assume that disputants' average final offers are similar across arbitration
procedures. It may seem unrealistic to assume that final offers will be similar across procedures
given that this is contrary to the existing theoretical predictions. The data, however, are
consistent with the possibility that average final offers are not different across arbitration
procedures. Under FOA average final offers for arbitrated outcomes are x=408 and x=573 for
disputants A and B, respectively. Under CombA, these same average final offers are x=415 and
x=567?1 These final offers are not statistically significantly different from the predicted risk
neutral final offers under FOA except for the average disputant A final offer of x=408 in FOA,
which is significantly lower than predicted (the risk neutral final offer predictions in FOA are
x=425 and x=575)?2 Dickinson (2001) reports results on CombA and modified forms of
CombA and also shows that final offers are generally not statistically different across arbitration
procedures, and they are not generally different from the FOA risk neutral predictions, even
across treatments that generate significantly different dispute rates. I therefore proceed assuming
that disputants may submit relatively similar final offers independent of the arbitration
procedure. 23
Similar final offers across arbitration procedures can imply one of two things. It could
imply that subjects are unable to fully understand the procedures and their different incentives.
The possibility that I entertain in exploring optimism is that, rather than respond to the
procedures' incentives by submitting different final offers, subjects respond to the different
incentives by changing their propensity to dispute-this hypothesis is supported by the data.

21 Unfortunately, the computerized experimental design does not allow for subjects to submit fmal offers under CA,
and so we have no data on disputants' fmal bargaining positions prior to invoking CA.
22 The null hypothesis that the average fmal offer equals 425 is rejected at the p=.02 level for the two-tailed test.
23 This assumption may be true on average, but not true for any given disputant. It is still the case, however, that the
data are more in favor of this assumption than the assumption that disputants submit fmal offers similar to the
theoretical predictions.

21

Figure 2 shows disputant A' s subjective density function for the arbitrator' s notion of a
fair settlement, z, under what I call disputant optimism. As can be seen, optimism implies that
fez) is perceived to be skewed favorably to disputant A. Disputant B would similarly perceive
the distribution as skewed toward higher z values (a mirror image of Figure 2 about the median,
e.g.). Final offers of disputant A and B are Xa and Xb and they are positioned symmetrically
about the median of the distribution. This description of how disputants might perceive the
distribution of z implies optimistic perceptions of the average z, but it also involves skewing the
distribution as opposed to just shifting the mean of the distribution. If, however, disputants
perceive fez) as skewed in this fashion, then one can easily show that under the linear payoffs in
these experiments and for certain shapes of distributions (such as the one shown in Figure 2), the
disputants' expected payoffs among arbitrated outcomes are highest in CombA and lowest in CA
given Xa and Xb. The basic idea is that compared to CA, in which the given draw of z is the
arbitrated settlement for x, FaA would cost disputant A an amount approximated by areas A and
C, since draws of z along the horizontal axis in these areas involve higher payoff outcomes for
disputant A under the FaA rules than under the CA rules. Similarly, areas Band D represent
gains under FaA to disputant A. As long as B+D>A+C (and payoffs are linear in x), disputant
A prefers FaA to CA in terms of expected payoff.
Similar reasoning implies that CombA is preferred to FaA for disputant A. The
arbitration rules for the center of the distribution-areas Band C-are the same under CombA
and FaA, and since A>D disputant A has higher expected payoffs under CombA. Comparing
CombA to CA, the arbitration rules for the tails of the distribution are the same, and since B>C
disputant A also has higher expected payoffs under CombA compared to CA. Disputant B
likewise prefers CombA to FaA, CombA to CA, and FaA to CA if this type of optimism is
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present. If certain arbitration procedures generate higher expected payoffs for the disputants,
then we would predict that the preferred procedures would be invoked more frequently . This
would then generate a prediction of highest disputfe rates in CombA, followed by FaA, and the
lowest dispute rates in CA. This ordering of dispute rates is completely consistent with these
results as well as those reported in Ashenfelter et al (l992)?4 Of course, this is not a general
argument or a rigorous proof, but the point I want to make is that disputant optimism could be
responsible for the results reported in this paper. Again, note that the disputant optimism
hypothesized is different than assuming that disputants have divergent expectations only of the
mean of fez). Figure 2 is based on an assumption of perceived skewed distributions of z that
reflect a common estimate of the median of f(z) , but optimism as to the shape off(z).
This is no doubt an ad hoc argument that is constructed, in part, as an attempt to reconcile
the data with the theoretical predictions of the various arbitration procedures, and I do not claim
this it satisfactorily explains all the data. In all fairness to the theoretical predictions of CombA,
the concern for external validity in the experimental design (i.e., presenting past draws from the
preferred settlement distribution) perhaps opened the door for such asymmetries in disputant
expectations. Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that CombA provides less incentives for
agreement when subjects possess the identical expectation assumed in the theory. The theory
behind CombA does, however, predict convergence of final offers even under some
considerations of asymmetric expectations, and so there is clearly room for more research to help
clarify the cause of disputes under this innovative procedure. A more rigorous theoretical
examination of all dispute resolution procedures that explores the possibility of some type of

The highest reported dispute rates in CombA are, however, statistically no different than those in FOA. This is
also consistent with the hypothesis of disputant optimism when area A of Figure 2 is only slightly larger than area D
(Le., disputants perceive the f(z) tails as fatter for more personally preferable settlements, but most of the optimism
is around the high probability median of the distribution.)
24
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disputant optimism may help resolve the issue more definitively. I believe it would be useful to
start incorporating such biased perceptions of reality into our formal theories of dispute
resolution, both because such biased perceptions are well-documented and because our existing
theories based on symmetric expectations do not always explain the data well.
7.

Conclusion
This paper has presented results from a controlled laboratory study of bargaining

behavior under commonly-used arbitration procedures as well as under an innovative procedure
called Combined Arbitration. While the initial interest in CombA was that it theoretically
promised convergence of disputants' final offers, and therefore no need to actually invoke the
procedure, the data do not support the theoretical predictions. Specifically, the data show that
the same disputant pairs are least likely to dispute using CA, and most likely to dispute using
FOA and CombA. The mere existence of arbitration procedures to handle dispute resolution
promotes their use, as is evidenced by the fact that all arbitration procedures tested significantly
increase dispute rates versus resolving disputes by destroying the disputed "pie". Arbitration
procedures are found to decrease the time to reach a negotiated settlement, after controlling for
sample selection, without affecting the resulting monetary outcome of the dispute. Finally, a
history of conflict, female disputant(s), and religious/nonreligious bargaining pair are found to
increase the negotiated settlement times, while bargaining experience in the experiment as well
as in a naturally occurring environment (i.e., involvement in a court case) decrease negotiated
settlement times.
These results are consistent with the existing research of Ashenfelter et al (1992) in that a
controlled comparison of FOA and CA generates significantly higher dispute rates in FOA. This
by itself is an important contribution to the literature since this result is contrary to the typical
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argument that FOA will reduce arbitration's chilling effect on bargaining. While the Ashenfelter
el al study generated this same result, the details of their experimental environment left open the
door for another logical explanation of this result. The results I report offer additional
confirmation that the finding of higher dispute rates in FOA is robust in a controlled setting. An
important policy implication is that CA is likely to produce more desirable results since
disputants more often negotiate their own settlement rather than let arbitration dictate the
settlement. Further, reports of some successes offield use ofFOA may be more due to creative
modifications of the FOA procedure that render it a rather different arbitration procedure than
what the strict rules ofFOA dictate (see Feigenbaum, 1975).
The data presented in this paper also provide original evidence on the comparative
effectiveness of an innovative arbitration procedure, CombA, on disputant behavior.
Unfortunately, dispute rates are found to be higher in CombA than in CA, and at least as high as
dispute rates in FOA. The final offers submitted by disputants in CombA are also not
significantly distinct from those in FOA?5 These unexpected results are possibly explained by
assuming that disputants are optimistic in assuming that arbitrator notions of a fair settlement are
skewed in their favor. The hypothesis is ad hoc, but the data are consistent with a belief in this
type of disputant optimism. This may imply that presenting raw information on past arbitrator
awards may be limiting in its ability to generate fully informed expectations of arbitrator
behavior. Future research will hopefully explore the possibility of disputant optimism as a
potential contributor to bargaining impasse, and also a potential cause of differences in the
likelihood of dispute across different dispute resolution procedures. This research does,

This result, in and of itself, may imply that disputants do not gain much information from the table of 100 draws
from the arbitrator z distribution. This is not inconsistent with disputants then forming their own optimistic
expectation of what the actual arbitrator notion of a fair settlement will be. Future experiments will then need to
more directly control for subject expectation in order to conduct pure tests of the theory.
25
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however, highlight that theories based on divergent expectations, self-serving bias, or optimism
(or whatever other name we can think of to describe heterogeneous expectations) are likely
necessary for satisfactorily understanding of the cause of disputes.
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TABLE 1
Variable

Description

1Female, 2Female

Dummy variables=l if bargaining pair consists of 1 or 2 females

1Business,2Business

Dummy variables=l if bargaining pair consists of 1 or 2 business majors

1Religious*

Dummy variable=l if bargaining pair contains 1 individual who
regularly attends religious services

110b, 210b

Dummy variables=l if bargaining pair consists of 1 or 2 current workers

1Court**

Dummy variable= if bargain pair contains 1 individual who has been
involved in a court case

1Union, 2Union

Dummy variables=l if bargaining pair consists of 1 or 2 individuals who
have either been a union member, or had a friend or relative in a union

Round

the round of bargaining

Variable counting the number of previous rounds in which the
bargaining pair has disputed (not reached agreement)
*Due to the relatively large population of Mormon students in Utah, no bargaining pairs exist in this
sample in which neither member of the pair regularly attends religious services. 1Religion is then
compared to the omitted category of two "religious" disputants in the pair.
**No bargaining pair contained both individuals who had participated in a court case
ConflictHistory
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TABLE 2

Independent
Variable

Constant
CA
FOA
CombA
1Female
2Female
1Religious
1Court
1Union
2Union
1Business
2Business
Ijob
2job
Round
ConflictHistory

Dependent Variable
DisEute
Probit Model
(random effects)
Marginal Effect
(p-value)

Dependent Variable
X-Outcome
Least Squares Regression
(sample selection corrected)
Direct Effects in Regression
(p-value)

Column 1

Column 2

Column 3

Column 4

Column 5

Column 6

-.29 (.00)*
.27 (.00)*
.34 (.00)*
.38 (.00)*

-.46 (.05)*
.29 (.00)*
.37 (.00)*
.41 (.00)*
-.09 (.38)
.08 (.55)
-.03 (.82)
.06 (.55)
.02 (.92)
.13 (.57)
-.03 (.82)
.22 (.19)
.15 (.43)
.09 (.63)
-.01 (.28)
.02 (.36)

63.82 (.00)*
-42.37 (.00)*
-49.08 (.00)*
-59.47 (.00)*

81.97 (.00)*
-21.90 (.00)*
-31.14 (.00)*
-38.50 (.00)*
13.49 (.00)*
12.23 (.02)*
9.17 (.06)*
-9.98 (.02)*
-5.36 (.16)
5.11 (.40)

484.94 (.00)*
1.38 (.92)
-.12 (.99)
-9.74 (.61)

498.45 (.00)*
11.38 (.53)
21.40 (.32)
14.27 (.54)
-14.40 (.26)
-28.56 (.07)*
-18.06 (.22)
9.81 (.46)
-6.78 (.56)
-11. 78 (.52)

"'Total N=960
(48 pairs times
20 rounds)

Dependent Variable
Agree Time
Least Squares Regression
(sample selection corrected)
Direct Effects in Regression
(p-value)

N=960

N=960

57.51 (.00)*
N=513

-3.38 (.00)*
5.72 (.00)*
24.36 (.01)*
N=513

15.33 (.48)
N=513

-.98 (.49)
6.23 (.02)*
-18.83 (.53)
N=513

Model test
F4,508=28.55
(p=.00)*

Model test
F 12,500=20.30
(p=.OO)*

Model test
F4,508=.28
(p=.89)

Model test
F 12,500=1.36
(p=.18)

-538.38
-531.01
Log-likelihood
*Indicates statistical significance at the .10 level of better
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A Comparison of Conventional, Final-Offer, and "Combined" Arbitration for Dispute
Resolution *

David L. Dickinson
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ABSTRACT

This paper presents results from a controlled laboratory study of bargaining behavior and
dispute rates under three types of arbitration procedures. Two of these--conventional and finaloffer arbitration-are commonly used in practice, while an innovative procedure called
"Combined Arbitration" (Brams and Merrill, 1986) is not currently used. Combined Arbitration
combines the rules of the two most commonly used forms of binding arbitration (conventional
and fmal-offer arbitration) in such a way as to generate convergent final offers in theory.
Controlled laboratory results show, however, that disputes are most likely in Combined
Arbitration and least likely in conventional arbitration. These results challenge the theoretical
predictions of Combined Arbitration as well as the hypothesis that final-offer arbitration would
be more likely to reduce disputes compared to conventional arbitration. The results may be
consistent with the hypothesis that disputants are relatively optimistic about the arbitrator's
notion of a fair settlement. Implications of these findings are also discussed.
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1.

Introduction

Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is of immediate interest due to the widespread use
and attraction of ADR, which is used to help resolve disputes in labor/management relations,
commercial and insurance disputes, and domestic disputes, among others. Commonly used ADR
procedures include mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration. Of these, only binding arbitration
guarantees settlement of the dispute since the settlement is determined by the arbitrator in the
event of bargaining impasse. That said, researchers and practitioners have noted that the
effectiveness of an arbitration procedure may lie in its ability to induce negotiated settlements
(see, e.g., Stevens (1966)). The identification of the most effective arbitration procedure is then
desirable for two reasons: First, effective procedures imply more negotiated settlements, and
disputants generally prefer to dictate their own settlement. Secondly, invoking arbitration with
less frequency implies a significant savings in terms of time and money costs.
In this paper I present the results from a controlled laboratory test of disputant behavior
under three different arbitration rules. This lab study generates original data that compares the
two most commonly used forms of arbitration, conventional arbitration (CA) and final-offer
arbitration (FOA), to an innovative procedure called "Combined Arbitration" (CombA). In CA,
the arbitrator is free to impose any settlement on the disputants, whereas the rules of FOA
stipulate that the arbitrator is constrained to choose one of the disputants' final offers. Brams
and Merrill (1986) devise the CombA procedure by combining the rules of CA and FOA in a
way that generates the theoretical prediction that disputants' final offers converge to agreement. 1
The rules of CombA are simple. If the arbitrator's notion of a fair settlement lies between the

1 Brams and Merrill also suggest a modified version of CombA that does not yield theoretically convergent [mal
offers, but may involve less uncertainty for the disputants than the standard CombA procedure. I test CombA along
with the modified CombA procedures in Dickinson (2001), and the results suggest that dispute rates are significantly
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disputants final offers, then the rules of FOA are used. Otherwise, the rules of CA are used. If it
can be determined empirically that disputant behavior is in agreement with their theory, then
CombA offers a potential major advantage over commonly used arbitration procedures in that it
is more likely to induce a voluntary settlement by the disputants.
A primary goal of this paper is to report results comparing dispute resolution under the
innovative CombA procedure with commonly used arbitration procedures. A secondary goal is
to provide a controlled comparison of the two commonly used procedures, CA and FOA. This is
necessary because the existing research contains mixed or inconclusive reports on the
effectiveness of CA versus FOA, and this debate is far from resolved. Feuille (1975), for
example, reports results based on field data that support the contention that FOA is invoked less
frequently than CA, whereas Feigenbaum (1975) notes that many forms ofFOA used in practice
are not actually pure FOA mechanisms. 2 Empirical studies based on field data may then be
guilty of comparing apples and oranges by lumping together quite distinct forms of arbitration
under the title of "FOA". More recent research has used lab studies or mock negotiations to
compare the effectiveness of different ADR procedures. Notz and Starke (1978) generally
conclude that there is more concessionary behavior under FOA than under CA, while
Ashenfelter et al. (1992) find higher dispute rates under FOA than CA.
Ashenfelter et al. is the first laboratory study comparing alternative arbitration
procedures-CA and FOA are included in their comparison-that mechanizes the arbitrator

lower under basic CombA than under modified CombA. For this reason the basic CombA procedure was chosen as
the most effective of the CombA procedures for purposes of the continued investigation.
2 He notes that in Eugene, Oregon, the FOA procedures originally allowed each disputant to submit two [mal offers.
The FOA system used in Michigan functioned more like mediation-arbitration by allowing the arbitrator to pick and
choose [mal offers among specific issues.
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